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Abstract
Recent advances in intrusion detection field brought new requirements to intrusion prevention and response.
Traditionally, the response to an attack was manually triggered by an administrator. However, increased
complexity and speed of the attack-spread during recent years showed acute necessity for complex dynamic
response mechanisms. Although intrusion detection systems are being actively developed, research efforts in
intrusion response are still isolated. In this work we present taxonomy of intrusion response systems, together
with a review of current trends in intrusion response research. We also provide a set of essential fetures as a
requirement for an ideal intrusion response system.
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Abstract
Recent advances in intrusion detection field brought new requirements to intrusion prevention and response.
Traditionally, the response to an attack was manually triggered by an administrator. However, increased com-
plexity and speed of the attack-spread during recent years showed acute necessity for complex dynamic response
mechanisms. Although intrusion detection systems are being actively developed, research efforts in intrusion
response are still isolated. In this work we present taxonomy of intrusion response systems, together with a re-
view of current trends in intrusion response research. We also provide a set of essential fetures as a requirement
for an ideal intrusion response system.
1 Introduction
Intrusion detection has been the center of intense research in the last decade owing to the rapid increase of
sophisticated attacks on computer systems. It typically refers to a variety of techniques for detecting attacks in
the form of malicious and unauthorized activity. In the event an intrusive behavior is detected, it is desirable
to take (evasive and/or corrective) actions to thwart attacks and ensure safety of the computing environment.
Such counter-measures are referred to as intrusion response. Although intrusion response component is often
integrated with the intrusion detection system (IDS), it receives considerably less attention than IDS research
owing to the inherent complexity in developing and deploying response in an automated fashion. As such,
traditionally, triggering an intrusion response is left as a part of the administrator’s responsibility requiring high-
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degree of expertise. In recent years, some commercial IDS made available a small set of automated responses,
such as blocking and logging actions [2]. However, with the increase in the complexity of intrusions and with it
IDSs, necessity for complex dynamically triggered response strategies becomes obvious.
In this paper we attempt to provide a taxonomy of intrusion response and a review of the current status of
the existing intrusion response systems (IRS) classified according to the presented taxonomy. By devising this
classification we aim
• to give researchers a better understanding of the problem. This taxonomy gives a brief comprehensive
overview of the intrusion response field.
• to expose unexplored areas in the field. Comparative study of the classifications of existing work shows the
research ”gap” in the current state-of-art IRSs. This provides useful insights in the requirements of better
and viable intrusion response mechanisms and opens avenues of future research.
• to provide a foundation for organizing research efforts in the field of intrusion response. To the best of our
knowledge a comprehensive and systematic research classification of intrusion response systems does not
exist. Some research works on classifications of IDS mention response mechanisms[11, 24, 3], but do not
directly focus on the response part of IDS and therefore, lack the necessary depth. The goal of this paper is
to provide a complete taxonomy of the existing intrusion response systems accompanied by representative
examples. This paper is the first attempt to organize existing research efforts in this area which as we hope
will be extended by other researchers in the future.
It should be noted that the presented taxonomy discusses advantages and limitations of the described response
techniques merely to draw researchers’ attention to these areas and not to advocate for any particular response
mechanism. The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: We present a taxonomy of intrusion response
mechanisms in Section 2, followed by the review of the existing research efforts in Section 3. Section 4 discusses
current state of the intrusion response field and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Taxonomy of Intrusion Response Systems
The general problem of constructing a novel taxonomy is the lack of common terminology. In these cases
researchers tend to resort to a descriptive explanation or known term that have meaning close to the described
phenomena. Since we face the same vocabulary problem, we attempt to find new terms for the newly described
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of the intrusion response systems
The proposed taxonomy is given in Figure 1. In the reminder of this section we provide details on each of
the categories in the given classification. Intrusion response systems can be classified according to the following
characteristics:
• Activity of triggered response
– Passive: Passive response systems do not attempt to minimize damage already caused by the attack
or prevent further attacks. Their main goal is to notify the authority and/or provide attack information.
– Active: As opposed to passive systems, active systems aim to minimize the damage done by the
attacker and/or attempt to locate or harm the attacker.
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Passive Active
Administrator notification: Host-based response actions:
generate alarm deny full/selective access to file
(through email, online/pager notification, etc.) delete tampered with file
generate report allow to operate on fake file
(can contain information about one intrusion restore tampered with file from backup
such as attack target, criticality, time, restrict user activity
source IP/user account, description of suspicious packets, etc. disable user account
as well as intrusion statistics for some period of time) shutdown compromised service/host
such as number of alarms from each IDS,) restart suspicious process
attack targets grouped by IP etc) terminate suspicious process
enable additional IDS disable compromised services
enable local/remote/network activity logging abort suspicious system calls
enable intrusion analysis tools delay suspicious system calls
backup tampered with files
trace connection for information gathering purposes Network-based response actions:
enable/disable additional firewall rules
restart targeted system
block suspicious incoming/outgoing network connection
block ports/IP addresses
trace connection to perform attacker isolation/quarantine1
create remote decoy1
Table 1: List of common passive and active intrusion responses.
Majority of the existing intrusion detection systems provide passive response. Among 20 IDS eval-
uated by Axelsson [3], 17 systems supported passive response while only 3 systems were designed
to mitigate the damage or harm the attacker. Table 1 gives an overview of the passive and active
approaches used in the existing response systems.
• Level of automation The classification according to the level of automation has been presented in early
works by several authors [25, 7, 19]. However, employing only these categories gives a very broad view of
the response systems and hence does not provide enough information about the existing research efforts.
The taxonomy presented here, on this categorization, also includes additional principles that emphasize
differences between various existing approaches.
– Notification systems: Notification systems mainly provide information about the intrusion which
is then used by system administrator to select an intrusion response. Majority of the existing IDS
provide notification response mechanism.
1Borrowed from [27]
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– Manual response systems: Manual response system provides higher degree automation than
notification-only systems and allows system administrator to launch an action from a predetermined
set of responses based on the reported attack information.
– Automatic response systems: As opposed to manual and notification approaches, automatic re-
sponse systems provide immediate response to the intrusion through automated decision making
process. Although intrusion detection systems are greatly automated nowadays, automatic intrusion
response support is still very limited.
∗ Ability to adjust
· Static: Majority of the IRS are static as the response selection mechanism remains the same
during the attack period. These systems can be periodically upgraded by the administra-
tor, however, such support is manual and often delayed till the moment when considerable
amount of intrusions exposes the inadequacy of current response mechanism. Although this
approach takes a conservative view of the system and environment, it is simple and easy to
maintain.
· Adaptive: The adaptability of the response is an ability of system to dynamically adjust re-
sponse selection to the changing environment during the attack time. Adaptation capability
can be represented in several ways including (a) adjustment of system resources devoted to
intrusion response such as activation of additional IDS, or (b) consideration of success and
failure of responses previously made by the system. The latter can refer to both detection
and response mechanisms. Failure of the response can be due to the mistake of IDS that
falsely flagged normal activity as intrusion or due to the mistake of IRS that triggered an
inappropriate response.
∗ Time instance of the response
· Proactive (preemptive): Proactive response system allows to foresee the incoming intru-
sion before the attack has effected the resource. Such prediction is generally hard and often
relies on the probability measures and analysis of current user/system behavior. Proactive-
ness of the response also requires that the detection and response mechanisms are tightly-
coupled such that responses can be fired as soon as a likelihood of attack is identified. Al-
though proactive detection of the attack and early response is a desired feature, it is often
hard to guarantee 100% correctness of the triggered action. The trade-off between the cor-
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rectness of the attack detection and timely response to the possible attack is an inherent
characteristic of intrusion response systems.
· Delayed: The response action is delayed until the attack has been confirmed. Such assur-
ance may be provided through the confidence metrics of IDS or full match of the intrusive
trace with an existing attack signature. Although, majority of the existing systems use de-
layed response approach, it may not be suitable for safety-critical systems. For example,
for systems relying on checkpoints as fault tolerance mechanism, a delayed response might
lead to inability of a system to roll back to the safe state.
Generally, the delayed response leaves more time to the attacker, consequently allowing
more damage to occur and therefore putting the greater burden of system recovery on the
system administrator.
The proactive and delayed intrusion responses have also been considered by several researchers
[9, 5] as incident prevention and intrusion handling of intrusion response respectively. Proactive
response is merely an incident prevention that takes place before attack has succeeded, while
delayed response is intrusion handling that is performed after the intrusion and includes actions
to restore system state. While these two steps should be performed sequentially to provide full
system defense and repair, often systems fall back into one of approaches.
∗ Cooperation capabilities
· Autonomous: Autonomous response systems handle intrusion independently at the level it
was detected. As such, a host-based IDS detecting an intrusion on a single machine will
trigger a local response action such as terminating a process, shutting down the host, etc.
· Cooperative: Cooperative response systems refer to a set of response systems that combine
efforts to respond to an intrusion. Cooperative system can consist of several autonomous
systems that are capable of detecting and responding to intrusions locally, however the final
or even additional response strategy is determined and applied globally. Often network IRS
are built in such cooperative manner. It allows to achieve better performance in terms of
speed of the response and volume of the contained damage. Although cooperative systems
provide more effective response than autonomous systems alone, they are also more complex
requiring strong coordination and communication among their components.
∗ Response selection mechanism. A step into distinguishing various response selection principles
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was taken by Toth et al.[25, 24]. The authors noted that majority of the existing approaches use
static mapping tables or rules based dynamic engines which we define as static and dynamic
mapping approaches.
· Static mapping: Static mapping systems are essentially automated manual response sys-
tems that map an alert to a predefined response. For example, alert about attack on a host
can trigger dropping incoming/outgoing network packets. These systems are easy to build
and maintain. However, they are also predictable and therefore, vulnerable to intrusions,
in particular, denial-of-service attacks. Another weakness of the static mapping systems is
their inability to take into account the current state of the whole system. In static mapping
systems the triggered response actions present isolated efforts to mitigate the attacks with-
out considering current condition and the impact on other services and system in general.
Additionally, as it has also been noted by Toth[25], this approach seems to be infeasible for
large systems where the volume of threat scenarios to be analyzed and the constant changes
in system policies make the process of building such decision tables cumbersome and prone
to errors.
· Dynamic mapping: Dynamic response mapping systems are more advanced than static
mapping systems as the response selection is based on the certain attack metrics (confidence,
severity of attack, etc). In the dynamic mapping setting an intrusion alert is associated with
a set of response actions. The exact action is chosen in real-time based on the characteristics
of the attack. Generally the selection mechanism for an alert can be presented by a set of
”if-then” statements. For example,
if unauthorized user gains access to the password file then
if confidence of attack is greater than 50% then
disable user account and restore password file from backup
if confidence of attack is smaller than 50% then
give a fake password file
Generally, by adjusting attack metrics we can provide more flexibility in intrusion response
selection. For example, attacks with low confidence and severity level can be ignored; mod-
erately severe intrusions with low certainty can be traced while high severity attacks can be
responded with appropriate actions. Although this approach can still be potentially exploited
by an adversary, it provides much more fine-grained control in response to an attack.
7
· Cost-sensitive: Cost-sensitive response systems are the only response systems that attempt
to balance intrusion damage and response cost. The optimal response is determined based
on the cost-sensitive model that incorporates several cost and risk factors. Usually these
factors are divided into factors related to the intrusion such as damage cost and factors
characterizing response part such as response action cost. Accurate measurement of these
factors is one of the challenges in using these cost models. Numeric values such as monetary
values, probabilistic measurement or percentages that correspond to some objective metrics
are not always suitable, as more effective solution based on relative measurements can be
applied [17]. The relative measurements can be contracted based on organization security
policies, risk factors, etc[12]. One of the downsides of this approach is the necessity to
update cost factor values with time. In most cases it is done manually which also puts
additional burden on the system administrator.
3 Examples
In this section we will discuss the existing intrusion response systems in relation to the proposed taxonomy.
3.1 Static vs. Adaptive
The response models proposed by Foo et al. [10] and Carver et al.[8, 7, 19] are examples of an adaptive approach.
AAIRS, due to [8, 7, 19], provides adaptation through confidence metric associated with each IDS and through
success metric corresponding to the response component of the system. The confidence metric indicates the
rate of false positive alarms to correct number of intrusions generated by each IDS employed by the system.
Similarly, the success metric indicates response actions and response plans that were more successful in the past.
Similar adaptation concept based on the feedback is presented in ADEPTS [10]. In this case effectiveness
index, a metric showing effectiveness of a response action against particular attack, is decreased if the action
fails. While ADEPTS supports automatic update of the response effectiveness metric, AAIRS requires system
administrator intervention after each incident.
Unlike these two solutions, other models considered in Table 2 offer no adaptation support in response
mechanism.
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3.2 Proactive vs. Delayed
Among the existing response systems presented in the literature, the majority fall into delayed response category.
One of the solutions in these models is suspension of the suspicious processes until the intrusion has been con-
firmed [4, 23]. Such suspension can be temporal until further response strategy is formulated [4] or permanent
until the system decides to abort delayed program [23]. Another approach in delayed response is allowing the
execution of the suspicious behavior until the observed pattern has matched an intrusive signature [29, 27].
A rare example presented in recent work by Foo et al. [10] investigates a proactive approach to response
deployment. The proposed system employs an intrusion graph (I-Graph) to model attack goals and consequently
to determine possible spread of the intrusion. The mechanism maps alarms provided by the involved IDS to I-
Graph nodes and estimates the likelihood of the attack spread based on the alarm confidence values. Finally,
appropriate response actions are deployed targeting identified attack goals.
Another proactive handling of response was recently proposed by Locasto et al.[14]. FLIPS, intrusion pre-
vention system, is based on STEM technique[22] that allows to create unique environment for emulation of
selected application pieces prior to their real execution. Using this approach for code injected attacks, malicious
code can be recognized within a few bytes and prevented from execution.
The Cooperating Security Manager system (CSM) proposed by White et al.[29], although not specifically
designed to be proactive, can yield proactive reaction to intrusive behavior in certain cases. This is a distributed
approach that combines individual hosts equipped with CSM. While each host performs a local intrusion detec-
tion, it is also responsible for notifying other CSMs about suspicious activity. Clearly, instead of waiting for
intrusive activity from a user, notified host can take a proactive action to prevent it. An example of such situation
is when attacker attempts to gain unauthorized access to an account by trying different passwords. However,
instead of checking all possible passwords on one machine, attacker moves to a different host after each failed
attempt. While several unsuccessful logins can raise an alarm, single attempt will not be significant enough to be
flagged as suspicious. Therefore, reporting such activity to other CSM hosts allows to detect this attack.
3.3 Autonomous vs. Cooperative
There are several examples of the cooperative response systems in the published literature. One such example,
Survivable Autonomic Response Architecture (SARA) [13] was developed as unified approach to coordinate fast
automatic response. It consists of several components that function as sensors (information gathering), detectors
(analysis of sensor data), arbitrators (selection of appropriate response actions) and responders (implementation
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of response). These components can be arranged among participating machines in a manner that provides the
strongest defense. Thus, each host of the system can be equipped with arbitrator which can provide local intrusion
response and at the same time participate in a global response selection strategy.
Another cooperative model is EMERALD - a distributed framework for network monitoring, intrusion de-
tection and automated response proposed by Porras and Neumann[18]. The framework introduces a layered ap-
proach allowing to deploy independent monitors through different abstract layers of the network. The response
component of the framework is represented by the resolver that is responsible for analyzing attack reports and
coordinating response efforts. While resolvers are responsible for response strategy on their local level, they are
also able to communicate with resolvers at other EMERALD layers, participating in global response selection.
The Cooperative Intrusion Traceback and Response Architecture (CITRA) presented in [21] provides an
example of cooperative agent-based system. This architecture utilizes neighborhood structure where the infor-
mation about detected intrusion is propagated back through the neighborhood to the source of the attack and
submitted to the centralized authority. The centralized authority, referred to as Discovery Coordinator, finally
determines an optimal system response. While the Discovery Coordinator is responsible for coordinating global
response, local CITRA agents can issue a local response action on a local intrusion detection report.
All of the cooperative approaches to response selection and deployment tend to be distributed network-
oriented systems. While CSM system [29], discussed in the previous section, presents an example of autonomous
response system, it is a distributed IDS. CSM system allows hosts to share information and detect intrusive user
activity in a cooperative manner, however the response actions are determined and deployed by each machine
locally.
Other examples of autonomous response system include [23, 6, 26]. These are host-based systems specifically
oriented to handle local intrusion detection and response.
3.4 Static mapping vs. Dynamic mapping
Most tracing techniques fall into static mapping category and automatically respond to an intrusion by tracing it
back to the source and applying predetermined response actions [28, 20]. Although automated, these approaches
have a spirit of notification intrusion response systems as they mainly report about the intrusion source.
Several recent tracing mechanisms take one step further offering a combination of static and dynamic map-
ping techniques [27, 21]. TBAIR [27] framework suggests to trace the intrusion back to the source host and
dynamically select the suitable response such as remote blocking of the intruder, isolation of the contaminated
hosts, etc.
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Similar approach was taken by CITRA [21]. This framework integrates network-based intrusion detection,
security management systems and network infrastructure (firewalls, routers) to detect the intrusion, trace it back
to the source and coordinate local response actions based on the attack report. The response mechanism is based
on two factors: certainty and severity of the intrusion. While certainty represents the likelihood that reported
event is an intrusion, severity defines potential damage to the system and is mainly based on the policy of the
particular site. Depending on the reported certainty and severity values, a response action is chosen from a
predetermined set.
While these dynamic techniques rely on the underlying predefined set of responses, as opposed to static
mapping techniques, the actual action is determined dynamically based on additional factors specific to the
current intrusion attempt (intrusion confidence and severity).
Based on agent architecture SoSMART approach [15] is an example of statically mapped response selection
system. User-designed incident cases mapped to the appropriate responses present an available set of response
actions. In addition to this response decision set, SoSMART model employs a case-base reasoning (CBR) as
an adaptation mechanism that matches current system state to the situations previously identified as intrusive.
Based on the past experience an additional set of responses can be selected and deployed. Dynamic addition of
the new cases allows CBR system to evolve over time.
The next two discussed approaches also offer static mapping response selection mechanism as they rely on
the deployment of the prespecified response actions. Authors of [6, 26] proposed an approach to intrusion de-
tection and response based on the specifications of normal behavior expressed in BMSL (Behavioral Monitoring
Specification Language). BMSL specifies system behavior in a finite state machine automata fashion and aug-
ments each intrusion specification path with a response action. This action can be represented by invocation of a
response function, assignment to a state variable or a set of rules for process isolation.
The pH system developed by Somayaji and Forrest [23] is an intrusion detection and response system. Its
detection component is based on the normal behavioral profile of the system consisting of N-gram sequences of
system calls. Sequences of calls deviating from the normal behavior are considered anomalous and can be either
aborted or delayed. Although, these two response actions are simple and computationally not expensive, authors
acknowledge that they are not suitable for all applications and additional response might need to be considered.
3.5 Dynamic mapping vs. Cost-sensitive
CSM [29] and EMERALD [18] are dynamic mapping systems. In both approaches the selection of the response
strategy is based on confidence information about detected intrusive behavior produced by the detection compo-
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nent and severity metrics associated with an attack.
Another dynamic mapping technique specifically aimed at intrusion damage control and assessment, DC&A,
is proposed by Fisch[9]. DC&A tool contains two primary components: damage control processor responsible
for actions necessary to reduce or control the damage done by the intruder while the intrusion is still in progress
and damage assessment processor that performs post-attack measures aimed at system recovery. A specific
response action to an intrusion is selected by damage control unit based on a suspicion level of user’s activity
provided by IDS and from the responses available for the given suspicion level. If user’s suspicion level increases
with time a different response action can be later selected. After intruder leaves the system, damage assessment
processor will determine necessary actions to restore original system state based on final suspicion level asso-
ciated with the intruder. For example, the assessment procedure can include analysis of log files followed by
replacement of the stolen files from backup storage.
One of the most complex dynamic mapping approaches is Adaptive, Agent-based Intrusion response system
based on agent architecture (AAIRS) [8, 7, 19]. Framework agents represent the layers of the response process.
Intrusion alarms are first processed by the Master analysis agent which computes confidence level and classifies
the attack as new or ongoing. This classification is mainly based on the preset decision tables. This information is
then passed to the Analysis agent which generates action plan based on the response taxonomy. Authors proposed
6-dimentional taxonomy [8]: timing, type of attack, type of attacker, degree of suspicion, attack implications
and environmental constraints. Finally, the Tactics agent decomposes the response plan into specific actions and
invokes the appropriate components of the response toolkit. This work mainly presents a foundation for intrusion
response system as no specific techniques or algorithms necessary for AAIRS are provided.
Compared to the amount of work published on static and dynamic response selection mechanisms, the cate-
gory of cost-sensitive selection is relatively small.
The approach to intrusion response proposed by Lee at al. [12] is based on a cost-sensitive modeling of the
intrusion detection and response. Three cost factors were identified: operational cost that includes the cost of
processing and analyzing data for detecting intrusion, damage cost that assesses the amount of damage that could
potentially be caused by attack and response cost that characterizes the operational cost of reaction to intrusion.
These factors present the foundation of intrusion cost model, i.e total expected cost of intrusion detection, and
consequently provides a basis for a selection of an appropriate response.
Graph-based approach called ADEPTS, Adaptive Intrusion Response using Attack Graphs, as discussed in
the previous section, is proposed by Foo et al. [10]. Modeling intrusion using graph approach allows to identify
possible attack targets and consequently shows objectives of suitable responses. The response actions for the
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affected nodes in the graph are selected based on the effectiveness of this response to the particular attack in the
past, the disruptiveness of the response to the legitimate users and confidence level that indicates the probability
that real intrusion is taking place.
Models proposed by Toth and Kruegel [25] and Balepin el al. [4] not only consider costs and benefits of the
response actions, but also attempt to model dependencies between services in the system. Such modeling reveals
priorities in response targets and evaluates the impact of different response strategies on dependent services and
system.
The approach proposed by Toth and Kruegel [25] is a network-based response mechanism that builds depen-
dency tree of the resources on the network. The proposed algorithm for optimal response selection takes into
account a penalty cost of a resource being unavailable and capability of a resource that indicates the resource
performance if specified response strategy is triggered, compared to the situation when all resources are avail-
able. Clearly, the set of response actions with the least negative impact on the system (lowest penalty cost) is
chosen to be applied in response to the detected intrusion.
Similar approach, based on host-intrusion detection and response, was proposed by Balepin el al.[4]. In
this system, local resource hierarchy is represented by a directed graph. Nodes of the graph are specific system
resources and graph edges represent dependencies between them. Each node is associated with a list of response
actions that can be applied to restore working state of resource in case of an attack. A particular response for
a node is selected based on the cost of the response action (sum of the resources that will be affected by the
response action), the benefit of the response (sum of the nodes, previously affected by intrusion and restored to
working state) and the cost of the node or resource.
4 Discussion
Development of effective response mechanism for potential intrusions is inherently complex due to the require-
ment to analyze a number of “unknown” factors in various dimensions: intrusion cause/effect, identification of
optimal response, state of the system, maintainability etc. As such, it is absolutely necessary to have a complete
understanding of problems that needs to be addressed for developing a smart and effective response system.
This paper presents a comprehensive discussion of various issues of intrusion response methods and classifies
different techniques along with their detailed comparison revealing the corresponding advantages and disadvan-
tages. An overview of the research and development of intrusion response system in the last decade is given in
Table 2 and can be summarized as follows:
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IRS Year Response Selection Response time Adjustment Cooperation ability
published ability
DC&A [9] 1996 dynamic mapping delayed static cooperative
CSM [29] 1996 dynamic mapping delayed/proactive static autonomous
EMERALD [18, 16] 1997 dynamic mapping delayed static cooperative
BMSL-based response [6, 26] 2000 static mapping delayed1 static autonomous
SoSMART[15] 2000 static mapping delayed2 static cooperative
pH [23] 2000 static mapping delayed static autonomous
Lee’s IRS [12] 2000 cost-sensitive delayed static autonomous
AAIRS[8, 7, 19] 2000 dynamic mapping delayed adaptive autonomous
SARA [13] 2001 static/dynamic mapping3 delayed static cooperative
CITRA [21] 2001 static/dynamic mapping delayed static cooperative
TBAIR [27] 2001 static/dynamic mapping delayed not defined4 cooperative
Network IRS [25] 2002 cost-sensitive not defined5 static cooperative
Specification-based IRS [4] 2003 cost-sensitive delayed static autonomous
ADEPTS [10] 2005 cost-sensitive proactive adaptive autonomous
FLIPS [14] 2005 static mapping proactive static6 autonomous
Table 2: Classification of the surveyed systems.
• Recent years have seen increased interest in developing cost-sensitive modeling of response selection.
The primary aim for applying such a model is to ensure adequate response without sacrificing the normal
functionality of the system under attack. Our survey shows that though a number of response frameworks
often offer facilities responsible for these mechanisms, very few works provide the detailed algorithms.
• In terms of response-deployment time, majority of proposed frameworks conservatively invoke responses
once the existence of intrusion is a certainty. Though this reduces false-positive response, delayed re-
sponses can potentially expose systems to higher level of risk from intrusions with no mechanism for
restoring system to its pre-attacked state. Therefore, a few research effort developed proactive response
mechanisms to enable early response to intrusions, notably, most of them appeared just recently. It should
be also mentioned that developing an optimal proactive response mechanism is difficult as it can pro-
hibitively increase false positives.
• Another elusive characteristic of response systems is adaptiveness. It is a powerful feature required to
ensure normal functionality while still providing effective defense against intrusive behavior, and to auto-
1Although not clearly described, the approach can be extended to proactive response.
2Although use of case-based reasoning technique can be adjusted to recognize repetetive attacks in advance.
3The authors also mention application of more complex response strategies based on some decision-making process.
4Proposed work only describes the general principles of framework.
5The paper only presents an algorithm for evaluation of response impact.
6Although the approach is called ”hybrid adaptive intrusion prevention”, adaptiveness mainly refers to the detection of future attacks
based on the feedback, and hence does not fall into adaptive response selection category
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matically deploy different responses on the basis of the current system state. At the same time, adaptiveness
brings system into the higher level of complexity and poses new questions such as ”How can we automat-
ically classify a response as success or failure? If the response has failed how can we determine whether
the system state changed due to triggered (failed) response or continuance of the attack? How can we sep-
arate the beginning of new intrusion and continuance of the old attack?” As such, very few of the existing
response mechanisms incorporate adaptation.
• Finally, we have seen the presence of both cooperative and autonomous response systems. Typically, host-
based intrusion response techniques are autonomous while cooperative methods are deployed in network
IDS. Although techniques presented here are existing research efforts, several commercial products with
limited automatic response support are also available today[2, 1]. While the research approaches employ
a range of different response selection principles, commercial tools provide only static mapping response
as simplest and easily maintainable solution.
An ideal intrusion response system. In light of the above discussion, we see the following features as re-
quirements for an ideal intrusion response system. We claim that these requirements will be the driving factor in
identifying various future avenues of research in this domain.
• Automatic. The volume and the intensity of the nowadays intrusions require rapid and automated re-
sponse. The system must be reliable to run without human intervention. Human supervision often brings a
significant delay into intrusion handling; the response system alone should have means to contain incurred
damage and prevent harmful activity. Although complete automation may not be achievable in practice
due to presence of newer and novel intractable intrusions, significant reduction of human effort and expert
knowledge is desirable.
• Proactive. The modern software systems are built on multiple heterogenously-developed components that
have complex interactions with each other. Because of these interactions, intrusions are likely to spread
faster in the system, causing more damage. Proactive approach to response is the most practical in intrusion
containment.
• Adaptable. The presence of multiple components, that constitute a software system, also results in a
dynamic environment owing to the complex interactions between components. As such, intrusive behavior
can affect systems in a way which is unpredictable. The intrusion response system should be equipped
with means to recognize and react to the changes in the dynamic environment.
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• Cost-sensitive. Response to intrusions in dynamic and complex systems require careful consideration of
the trade-offs among cost and benefits factors. A simple basic response action triggered every time certain
symptom is observed might be a wasteful effort and can cause more damage.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented taxonomy of the intrusion response systems. The proposed taxonomy provides an
insight into this important field allowing us to see several unexplored areas for research. This work is the first
attempt to organize existing knowledge and provides a foundation for further research in this area. We hope
that our work will inspire active research of intrusion response methods and will be further extended by other
researchers.
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